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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze whether or not there 
was a statistically significant reaction in financial markets to the announcements of 
US defense contractor consolidations (mergers and acquisitions) from January 1990 
to December 2006.  This analysis is conducted through the use of two series-of-
event studies (employing first the arithmetic and then the logarithmic returns against 
the S&P 500 index) involving the top five defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman.   
Many studies have been conducted using the event-study methodology, and 
the results have shown in some cases that stock prices do respond to new 
information. The assumption has been maintained that the market responds 
rationally to such announcements.  In contrast, the announcements of the 
acquisition of publicly traded firms by other publicly traded firms have not always had 
a consistently significant beneficial effect on the shareholder wealth of the acquiring 
firms (Schipper & Thompson, 1983).   Results of this case study further support the 
latter assertion and add to the body of research involving event studies. 
Keywords: defense industry, consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, event 
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I. Introduction 
A.  Purpose 
After the end of the Cold War, the aerospace and defense industry in the 
United States experienced considerable consolidation between 1990 and 2000, 
thereby reducing the number of major defense contractors to a small handful.  This 
consolidation trend has continued into 2006.  As a result of these aerospace and 
defense mergers and acquisitions, many policy questions have examined whether 
economic efficiencies have been gained, whether the US Department of Defense 
has benefited or been economically disadvantaged by the decrease in industry 
competition, and whether the industry contractors involved in the consolidations 
have gained greater financial advantages as a result of the consolidation.  A key 
component of whether the defense industry consolidation in the United States led to 
improvements in the financial performance of defense contractors is the market’s 
perception of the value created by the consolidations.  This perception of value is 
reflected in statistically significant reactions in the financial market value of the 
respective company’s stock. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze whether or not there 
was a statistically significant reaction in financial markets to the announcements of 
US defense contractor consolidations (mergers and acquisitions) from January 1990 
to December 2006.  Two series of event studies were analyzed, employing first the 
arithmetic and then the logarithmic returns against the S&P 500 index, and involving 
the top five defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, 
Raytheon and Northrop Grumman.   
B.  Scope and Organization of Research 
The scope of this project is focused on the aerospace and defense industry’s 
top five defense contractors.  This determination of the ranking companies is based 
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determination of these companies as the top five is consistent with the Annual 
Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, as submitted by the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Industrial Policy (DoD, 
1997-2001, 2001-2003, 2005 and 2006 reports).   Additionally, these five defense 
contractors have survived over a decade of mergers and acquisitions and serve as 
an excellent baseline for the event studies.   
The event studies included in this research effort involve a total of 125 merger 
and acquisition announcements and approximately 250 regression analyses using 
arithmetic and logarithmic returns for both the respective company securities and the 
S&P 500 index.  The announcements of the respective contractor firms were 
obtained from the Bloomberg database and verified by the respective corporate 
press releases documenting the announcements.  Table 1 lists the breakout by 
contractor and then sums the number of required regression runs. 
Contractor Number of Announcements 
Boeing 19 
Lockheed Martin 25 
General Dynamics 36 
Raytheon 18 
Northrop Grumman 27 
Totals 125 
 # Regression Runs 
Arith + Log 
Returns 
250 
Table 1.   Summary of Contractor Consolidation Announcements and Data Runs 
The scope of the event studies involves all Bloomberg database-documented 
and corporate press-release-verifiable consolidation announcements made between 
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acquisitions and physical asset acquisitions, and these are noted where applicable. 
In select cases, a date was found in Bloomberg but was not verifiable by any other 
corporate or public source. In these select cases, the announcement was omitted 
from the study to maintain the integrity of the verified dates listed. Any such 
omissions are noted and documented in Chapter IV of this paper.  The inferences 
and conclusions drawn from the event studies reflect only the scope of the project 
described herein. 
This paper is organized into several sections, and the next section in this 
chapter will address the application and benefits of this research in a general sense.  
Chapter II provides an overview of background information, beginning in Section A, 
with a brief discussion on terminology;  Section B continues with a commentary on 
the historical background and review of literature involving the aerospace and 
defense industry consolidation from 1990-2006.  
Chapter III details the methodology used for this research.  Section A 
provides additional information in selecting the defense contractors involved in this 
case study; Section B provides the recipes for the event studies using the arithmetic 
and logarithmic returns. Section C closes Chapter III by explaining the method of 
analysis used to interpret the data results from the regressions run in the event 
studies.   
Chapter IV includes the data results from the event studies completed for 
each contractor and provides the statistical data in tabular format for analysis.  
Chapter V follows with the overall summary inferences and conclusions drawn from 
the data outlined in Chapter IV.  Chapter VI concludes with recommendations for 
future research. 
C.  Application and Benefit of Research 
This research provides quantitative, statistically significant data to assist in 
addressing questions like, “Did the defense mergers in the United States lead to 
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the market’s perception of the value created from the industry consolidation?”  
Although the results from this case study are only germane to the top five defense 
contractors in the United States, the results do provide data on the strength and 
frequency of statistically significant abnormal returns on the respective company’s 
daily stock price.  This in and of itself supplies a glimpse of the market’s perception 
of the anticipated value created by the US defense industry consolidations involving 
Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman. 
The data gathered from this research can be used as the baseline for 
comparison when examining pre- and post-merger trends in the respective 
company’s financial performance.  By examining the ex-post data in light of the 
market perceptions of the individual US defense contractor consolidations, 
researchers are then able to infer whether or not the market’s statistically significant 
perception of the merger or acquisition became a reality for the company in 
question.   
Additionally, the results from this research provide policymakers with 
quantifiable and unbiased data with which to determine the benefit or loss the 
companies experienced through these acquisitions and mergers.  This information 
would be useful in determining future policy with regard to additional defense 
contractor mergers and acquisitions (i.e., should the DoD encourage or discourage 
mergers and acquisitions).  During the mid-to-late nineties, there was much 
speculation as to whether the wave of mergers and acquisitions were beneficial or 
harmful to the DoD and to the defense contractors. The results of this study shed 
some light on the issue. The application and benefit of the event study research is 
mentioned again and developed further in Chapter VI, where recommendations for 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 5 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
II. Background Information 
A. Terminology 
Throughout the course of this paper, several key terms are frequently used, 
and it is helpful at this juncture to clarify their respective meanings as applied to this 
research effort.   
1. Acquisition 
An acquisition refers to one company purchasing another. There is a clear 
acquirer, and the company purchased is referred to as the target.  Acquisition is a 
general term and is used in conjunction with the term “merger” throughout this 
paper. 
2. Merger  
A merger, similar in nature to an acquisition, refers to the absorption by a 
corporation of one or more other corporations.  Mergers are referred to as either 
being vertical or horizontal.  A horizontal merger is simply the combination of two or 
more firms or corporations in the same line of business.  Lockheed’s acquisition of 
Martin Marietta in 1994 is an example of a horizontal merger.  This study contains 
predominantly horizontal mergers within the US defense industry (Brealey, Myers & 
Allen, 2006). 
A vertical merger involves companies at different stages of production. For 
example, the purchasing company may acquire a source of raw material; the 
purchases are made within the supply chain and can ultimately extend to the 
customer (2006). 
The third type of merger is a conglomerate merger, which involves companies 
in unrelated lines of business (2006).  The term “merger” in this study refers 
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3.  Consolidation 
The term “consolidation” technically means the unification of two or more 
corporations by dissolution of the existing corporations and creation of a single, new 
corporation (“Consolidation,” 1991). The wave of mergers and acquisitions beginning 
in the early to mid 1990’s is referred to as the consolidation, or the unification, of the 
US defense industry.  As a result of the increase in consolidation, there were 
multiple unifications of industry corporations and a complete downsizing of the 
industry overall. This consolidation involved both acquisitions and mergers, and the 
term “consolidation” is used in reference to the merger and acquisition activities 
experienced by the corporations within the US defense industry. 
4.  Event Study 
An event study is simply a term used to describe an analysis of whether or 
not there is a statistically significant reaction in a given financial market to a 
particular event that is hypothesized to affect the market value of a public firm.  In 
this case, the announcement dates are referred to as “events.” 
B. Historical Background and Literature Review 
The US defense industry consolidation, beginning in the 1990’s and still 
occurring to date, has often been referred to as a wave of acquisitions and mergers.  
In their paper titled, “Catch a Wave: The Time Series Behavior of Mergers,” Devra L. 
Golbe and Lawrence J. White (1993) fit a set of sine waves to the annual time series 
data on mergers in the United States from 1900 to the mid-1980’s. They found the 
sine curves explain numerous trends.  The most recent merger and acquisition wave 
they identified was that occurring in the early and mid-1980’s, and they term it the 
fourth wave of mergers in the United States.  The wave of mergers and acquisition 
resulting in the consolidation of the US defense industry could very well be 
considered a fifth wave, as stated by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the 
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This section provides an overview of the historical trends involving the 
consolidation of the US defense industry prior to 1990, and then from 1990 to the 
present.  It also includes information on aspects of defense budget and defense 
policy that precipitated and further encouraged the defense industry consolidation.  
This discussion is meant to provide broader context for the significance and 
relevance of this case of event studies. 
Industry consolidation often results from available opportunities to improve 
efficiency when there are too many firms and an abundance of capacity.  The 
surplus of firms and the capacity they maintain often seem to trigger a wave of 
mergers and acquisitions (Brealey, Meyers & Allen, 2006).  What occurred in the US 
defense industry under such circumstances is not unusual (similar trends occurred in 
the banking industry), nor should it have been unexpected given the decrease in 
defense spending after the end of the Cold War.   
Figure 1, below, illustrates the defense spending of procurement and 
research and development (R&D) dollars from FY45 to FY08 to illustrate the funding 
trend over time compared to the national defense budget, each as a percentage of 












































































Procurement + RDT&E as a % of GDP
National Defense Budget as % of GDP
 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
From 1985 to 1998, there was a 51% decline in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) R&D and procurement spending.  The 10 largest companies in the mid-1980’s 
included McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Rockwell, General Electric, 
Boeing, Lockheed, United Technologies, Hughes, Raytheon and Grumman.   The 
national defense budget noticeably decreased between 1990 and 2000; this 
decrease is typically identified as the catalyst for the wave of acquisitions and 
mergers within the US defense industry.  Driessnack and King’s assertions counter 
this position by suggesting factors beyond decreased defense spending on 
procurement and R&D drove the consolidations: changing institutions and 
transaction costs (2004).  Irrespective of the precise cause, by the end of 2001 the 
US defense contractor top tier was reduced to five: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman.  These five defense firms 
received the same percentage of DoD prime contracts as the top 10 firms had in 
1985 (DoD, 1997-2007, 2003 report).  The following explanation of events reveals 
how this reduction transpired.   
In 1992, the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
jointly issued horizontal merger guidelines, which marked the first time the two 
federal agencies that share antitrust enforcement jurisdiction had issued joint 
guidelines.  The issuance of this merger guideline document (which was later 
updated in April of 1997) provided decision-makers the necessary framework for 
understanding how horizontal mergers and acquisitions (which were much 
anticipated at this time due to the reduction in defense spending) would be handled.  
The goal of the guidelines was to describe analytical foundations of merger 
enforcement and to provide guidance enabling the business community to effectively 
plan mergers and avoid antitrust problems.   
In 1993, a study was published by Price Waterhouse concerning industrial 
policy in the midst of a watershed of anticipated mergers.  This study, commissioned 
by the Clinton administration, asserted US industrial policy was necessary to ensure 
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Velocci summarized the study findings in his article, “Study Urges More Proactive 
Government Role in Aerospace,” published in Aviation Week & Space Technology in 
April 1993.  Some aerospace industry officials expected more supportive policies to 
emerge regarding the mergers and acquisitions because, ultimately, the DoD was 
partly responsible for the necessity to merge and consolidate due to its defense 
budget reductions.  The study also indicated companies which were already 
characterized by a mix of commercial and defense business would be most likely to 
succeed.  In the case of what are now regarded as the aerospace and defense 
industry’s top five firms, this mix has proven to be the most successful.   
A subsequent study was also conducted by the Defense Science Board 
(DSB), formed as a Task Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry 
Consolidation (Velocci, 1993), which sought to advise the DoD on what role it should 
play in antitrust considerations in the midst of the defense industry mergers and 
acquisitions.  It issued its report in 1994.  The DSB study concluded the merger 
guidelines established in 1992 were sufficient to assess mergers and acquisitions 
within the defense industry. 
The findings of the Price Waterhouse and DSB studies, in conjunction with 
the defense industry’s increased consolidation activities, prompted a hearing before 
the Congressional Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services in the House of Representatives. This was held on July 27, 1994.  
The topic of the hearing was the DoD policy on defense industry mergers, 
acquisitions, and restructuring—which was of extreme interest both to the US 
government and its defense industry counterparts.  Several key principal witnesses 
at this hearing included David E. Cooper, the Director, Acquisition Policy, 
Technology, and Competitiveness, US General Accounting Office; the Honorable 
John M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Mr. Norman Augustine, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Martin-Marietta Corporation.   
The hearing largely centered on the impacts of the mergers and acquisitions, 
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share of that cost.  Mr. Augustine, who appeared on behalf of Martin-Marietta and 
also seemed to serve as the spokesman for industry, remarked at one point, “under 
no circumstances does the Government pay any of the costs of any type having to 
do with the merger or the acquisition itself.  That is a shareholder issue, and the 
shareholder pays those costs, as we believe it should be” (Augustine, 1994, July 27, 
p. 39).   
During this time, and up through 1997, the DoD generally supported the 
process of the defense industry consolidation because the DoD was acutely aware 
that restructuring was required to eliminate or reduce the excess capacity and 
overhead, which translated into higher costs for weapon systems.  At the same time, 
the Pentagon expressed concern as vertical integrations were occurring “as major 
contractors swallow up their suppliers” (Cole, 1996).   
By March of 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report 
confirming this concern titled, Defense Industry Consolidation: Competitive Effects of 
Mergers and Acquisitions, which addressed the issue that perhaps the defense 
industry consolidations had gone too far—adversely affecting competition in the 
industry.  It speculated that the consolidation could pose future problems unless the 
DoD took appropriate actions to assess the implications of these mergers and 
acquisitions.  This report and others submitted by the GAO in June, 1998, prompted 
another Congressional hearing, this time before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
The topic this time was mergers and corporate consolidation in the new economy. 
At this hearing, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Honorable Alan Greenspan, made some interesting and 
revelatory comments.  In the midst of discussions about the impact of the mergers 
and acquisitions on the Department of Defense, Mr. Greenspan considered and 
questioned whether or not there was evidence of benefits to the consumer.  He 
compared the defense industry consolidation to that occurring in the banking 
industry and suggested the evidence of gained efficiencies and economic gains to 
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This case of event studies covering the mergers and acquisitions of the top five 
defense firms provides evidence to this effect.   
By the end of 2000, the Administration, Congress and the DoD were 
beginning to seek out actions to support the ability of the US aerospace industry in 
its efforts to remain robust in the future (“Commission to study relationship,” 2000, 
November 1).  A year later, Aviation Week & Space Technology, in collaboration 
with Charles River Associates, undertook a six-month analysis of the US defense 
industry consolidation that suggested industry was better off after the consolidation 
but that acknowledged it remained a subject of considerable debate (Velocci, 2001).  
For the next six years, the mergers and acquisitions continued amidst 
acknowledgement from some commentators that mergers would significantly reduce 
competition and drive up prices (Pearlstein, 2005). 
Recorded in Chapter IV of this report are the respective merger and 
acquisition announcements made by each of the top five defense industry 
contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop 
Grumman.  There has continued to be considerable consolidation within the defense 
industry extending into late 2006.  It is also evident that much public and private 
attention has been paid to these announcements, as well as considerable public 
debate leading up to them and continuing after the announcements have been 
made.   
The public perception of value in the acquisitions and mergers is reflected 
best in the market value of the respective firm’s securities (i.e., stock value).  An 
appropriate method to quantify whether that change in value is statistically significant 
is the event study.   The following chapter reviews the definition and usefulness of 
the event study (as found in several research efforts) and elaborates on the 
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III. Methodology 
A. Selection of Defense Contractors for Study 
The selection of the five defense contractors for this case of event studies 
was based on a collection of trending references from the 1997–2007 Annual 
Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress.  In the 2001 report, it reads: 
By the end of 2001, the five largest defense firms received the same 
percentage of DoD prime contracts as the top ten suppliers received in 1985.  
Therefore, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and 
Northrop Grumman, the largest five in 2001, are as dominant in the defense 
market, on a relative basis, as the largest ten in 1985. (DoD, 1997-2007, 2001 
report, p. 5)   
These five companies maintained dominance throughout the period of this 
study of the defense mergers—between January 1990 and December 2006.  The 
February 2006 Annual Defense Capabilities Report to Congress is the most recent 
of the series of reports to track the aforementioned five defense contractors as the 
“top five” in the industry. The individual company profiles supplied by the 
Datamonitor, dated as recent as July 2006, also support this assertion. 
This case of event studies is then focused on determining the statistical 
significance of abnormal stock returns for Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, 
General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman as those returns occur on (or on the day 
after) the announcement date of each merger/acquisition in which each of the 
respective top five contractors were involved between January 1990 and June 2006. 
B. Event Studies 
There is no unique structure to the design of the event studies, but most 
share a common recipe or general flow of analysis.  The purpose of this section is to 
explain the procedure used in this particular case study.  In the disciplines of 
accounting, economics and financial research, an event study is an analysis to 
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particular event that is hypothesized to affect the market value of a public firm.  A. 
Craig MacKinlay, author of “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” asserts: 
The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given rationality in 
the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in 
security prices.  Thus a measure of the event’s economic impact can be 
constructed using security prices observed over a relatively short period of 
time. (1997, March, p.13) 
Economists assume people act rationally within the marketplace, and that 
assumption is required for event study analysis; however, the reality is that people 
within the marketplace do not always act rationally.  This will become more apparent 
in the data analysis section of this report.  In this case, the researcher used 
statistical inference to determine if there was a statistically significant abnormal 
return in the stock value of each of the five major US aerospace and defense 
contractors, given an announcement of an impending merger or acquisition.  In other 
words, did the announcement of an impending consolidation involving the said 
company affect its stock price (positively or negatively) in a statistically significant 
way?   
To accomplish this study, the researcher required several pieces of data: 
announcement dates for the consolidations (defined here as the event), targets of 
the acquisitions or mergers, the acquiring defense firm’s daily stock price data, 
calculated stock returns and the daily index data for the S&P 500 and its calculated 
daily returns. The researcher collected announcement dates and announced targets 
from the Bloomberg database for each of the five contractors (Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman).  As mentioned 
previously, these dates were then verified with the respective corporate press 
releases found on the corporate websites.  The event window is typically defined as 
a larger timeframe than the specific period of interest.  In this case, the period of 
interest is the announcement date itself; the event window is defined as the 
announcement date plus one trading day after the announcement.  Inclusion of the 
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occurring after the stock market closes on the announcement date (MacKinlay, 
1997). 
Several options for tracing stock and index prices and calculated returns 
could have been used in these event studies: daily, monthly, quarterly or annually.  
In examining the frequency of consolidation announcements in conjunction with the 
desired level of granularity to track the abnormal returns, the researcher determined 
the daily stock return methodology seemed the most reasonable. The use of daily 
stock returns is supported in literature surrounding the use of stock returns in event 
studies (Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997). 
Brown and Warner (1985), in their paper titled, “Using Daily Stock Returns: 
The Case for Event Studies,” examined the properties of daily stock returns and how 
the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies.  They 
concluded that “daily data generally present few difficulties for event studies” (p. 10).  
This consideration, coupled with the frequency of consolidation announcements, 
drove the decision to use the daily stock price data (as opposed to the monthly, 
quarterly or annual averages) in the construction of these event studies.   
In order to determine the impact of the consolidation announcement on the 
price of a security (i.e., stock price), the abnormal return was measured.  The 
abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual ex post return of a 
security over the event window and the normal return (or expected estimated return) 
of the firm over an event window.  The subsequent calculation of the ex post return 
of a security in this case can either be calculated using arithmetic or logarithmic 
returns.  This case involved both arithmetic and logarithmic returns, respectively, in 
each of two series of event studies.   
The estimation window for the event studies (in calculations involving both the 
arithmetic and the logarithmic returns) is approximately (and on average) 120 days 
prior to, but not including, the announcement date.  In keeping with common event 
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prevent the event from influencing the normal performance estimates (Bowman, 
1983; Boehmer, Musumeci & Poulsen, 1991; McKinlay, 1997).  The methodology of 
calculating the abnormal returns based on daily arithmetic and daily logarithmic 
returns is detailed below.  
1. Daily Arithmetic Returns 
The daily arithmetic stock returns are simply the percentage change in stock 
price from day to day. Arithmetic stock returns are calculated by taking the difference 
between the current day’s stock price and the stock price of the day prior and 
dividing that difference by the stock price of the day prior.  
The daily arithmetic index returns represent the percentage change in the 
value of the index from day to day.  Daily arithmetic index returns are calculated by 
taking the difference between the current day’s index value and the index value of 
the day prior and dividing that difference by the index value of the day prior. 
Once the daily arithmetic stock and index returns were calculated, the daily 
arithmetic stock returns were regressed against the daily arithmetic index returns 
using the Excel data analysis regression tool.  The regression was run for a period of 
approximately 120 days (six months) prior to the consolidation announcement date, 
but did not include the announcement date.   
Next, the predicted return for the stock price on the announcement date was 
calculated using the regression equation and the value for the actual index return on 
that date.  The predicted return reveals what the stock return value would have been 
in the absence of the consolidation announcement based on the historical 
relationship between the stock and the index.  This value becomes the normal return 
value.   An example using a regression run from a Lockheed Martin arithmetic return 
regression run is provided for illustrative purposes.   
On January 8, 1996, Lockheed Martin announced it would acquire Loral 
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the S&P 500 index, and then the daily arithmetic stock returns are regressed against 
the daily arithmetic index returns using the Excel data analysis regression tool. The 
following table is supplied as output from the Excel data analysis regression tool. 
  Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.00099386 0.001050435 0.9461415 0.3459018
Index Return  
(X-Variable) 0.720999187 0.211131894 3.4149231 0.0008609
Table 2.   Lockheed Martin and Loral Arithmetic Return Regression Data 
The predicted return is calculated using the regression equation such that 
Lockheed Martin predicted stock return =  
Y- intercept + X-Variable Coefficient (actual index return on date of announcement) 
The coefficient values from Table 2 are substituted into the equation, and the 
predicted stock value is calculated: 
Predicted stock return = .00099386 + .720999187(.002838) = .003040056 
where 0.002838 is the previously calculated actual index arithmetic return on the 
date of the consolidation announcement. 
However, in order to determine the impact of the consolidation announcement 
on the stock price, the abnormal return must be measured.  The abnormal return is 
calculated by subtracting the predicted stock price return from the actual stock price 
arithmetic return on a given day.  In this case, it was calculated for the day of the 
announcement and five trading days thereafter, though the event itself is considered 
the announcement date and the day after the announcement. 
Again, a table is provided from the Lockheed Martin and Loral regression data 
for illustrative purposes.  The abnormal returns are calculated and listed in the far 
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Date of 
Stock Price Stock Price 








1/8/1996 40.125 0.0371567 618.46 0.002837638 0.03411691
1/9/1996 39.4375 -0.017134 609.45 -0.014568444 -0.00762398
Table 3.   Lockheed Martin and Loral Arithmetic Return Abnormal Return  
The abnormal return is then divided by the standard error of the regression to 
supply the test statistic required for the data analysis. The standard error is also an 
Excel output which is automatically generated by the data analysis regression tool. 
Regression 
Statistics   
Multiple R 0.292117464
R Square 0.085332613
Adjusted R Square 0.078015274
Standard Error 0.011660913
Observations 127
Table 4.   Lockheed Martin and Loral Standard Error (Arithmetic Return 
Regression) 
To complete this example, the test statistic (or t-stat) is calculated for January 
8, 1996, by dividing the abnormal return (.03411691) by the standard error 
highlighted in Table 4 (.011660913)—resulting in a t-stat value of 2.9257 (rounded).   
2. Daily Logarithmic Returns 
The daily logarithmic stock returns are calculated by dividing the natural 
logarithm after the current day’s stock price by the stock price one day prior.  The 
daily index logarithmic returns are calculated by dividing the natural logarithm after 
the current day’s index value by the index value of the previous day. 
Once the daily logarithmic stock and index returns are calculated, the daily 
logarithmic stock returns are regressed against the daily logarithmic index returns 
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approximately 120 days (six months) prior to the consolidation announcement date, 
but does not include the announcement date.   
Next, the predicted return for the stock price on the announcement date is 
calculated using the regression equation and the value for the actual index return on 
that date.  The predicted return reveals what the stock return would have been in the 
absence of the consolidation announcement, based on the historical relationship 
between the stock and the index.  This value becomes the normal return value.   An 
example using a regression run from a Lockheed Martin logarithmic returns 
regression run is provided for illustrative purposes. 
On January 8, 1996, Lockheed Martin announced it would acquire Loral 
Corporation.  The daily logarithmic returns are calculated for both the stock price and 
the S&P 500 index value, and then the daily logarithmic stock returns are regressed 
against the daily logarithmic index returns.  The following table (Table 5) is supplied 
as output from the Excel data analysis regression tool. 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.001072493 0.001039628 1.031612 0.304246
Index Return 
(X-Variable) 0.739308864 0.209018417 3.537051 0.000569
Table 5.   Lockheed Martin and Loral Logarithmic Return Regression Data 
The predicted return is calculated using the regression equation such that: 
Lockheed Martin predicted stock return =  
Y- intercept + X-Variable Coefficient (actual index return on date of announcement) 
The coefficient values from Table 5 are substituted into the equation, and the 
predicted stock value is calculated: 
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The value 0.002833362 is the previously calculated actual index arithmetic 
return on the date of the consolidation announcement.  However, in order to 
determine the impact of the consolidation announcement on the stock price, the 
abnormal return must be measured.  The abnormal return is calculated by 
subtracting the predicted stock price return from the actual stock price arithmetic 
return on a given day.   In this case, it is calculated for the day of the announcement 
and five trading days thereafter. 
Again, a table is provided from the Lockheed Martin and Loral regression data 
for illustrative purposes.  The abnormal returns have been calculated and are listed 
in the far right column of Table 6. 
Date of 









1/8/1996 40.125 0.036483 618.46 0.00283362 0.033315618 
1/9/1996 39.4375 -0.01728 609.45 -0.014675606 -0.007505129 
Table 6.   Lockheed Martin and Loral Logarithmic Return Abnormal Return  
The abnormal return (highlighted in blue in Table 6) is then divided by the 
standard error of the regression to supply the test statistic required for the data 
analysis.  
The standard error is also an Excel output, which is automatically generated 




Adjusted R Square 0.083707881
Standard Error 0.011545906
Observations 127
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To complete this example, the test statistic (or t-stat) would be calculated for 
January 8, 1996, by dividing the abnormal return (.033315618) by the standard error 
highlighted in Table 7 (.011545906) and resulting in a t-stat value of 2.8855 
(rounded).   
C. Method of Analysis 
The method of analysis for this case of event studies is a two-tailed 
hypothesis test using the test statistic calculated from data generated by the event 
studies to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis.   
1.  Hypotheses Defined 
The null hypothesis, denoted as Ho, is defined as the consolidation 
announcement having no effect on the abnormal return of a given stock price.  In 
other words, the null hypothesis is the abnormal return would be equal to zero.  The 
alternative hypothesis, denoted as H1, is defined as the consolidation announcement 
having an effect on the abnormal return of a given stock price. In other words, the 
abnormal returns are not equal to zero. This would mean the consolidation 
announcement had an effect on the abnormal return of the stock price.   
Mathematically, the hypotheses are represented as follows: 
Ho:  β1 = 0, where β1 represents the abnormal return 
H1:  β1 ≠ 0, where β1 represents the abnormal return 
2.  Determination of Statistical Significance 
If the abnormal returns calculated for a given date are not equal to zero, it is 
requisite to use the test statistic calculated from the data (as outlined previously in 
Section B) to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to infer statistical 
significance in the finding.  The calculated t-statistic is compared to the statistics 
table commonly titled, “Critical Values of t.”  A subsection of this table is pasted 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Deg. Frdm t.100 t.050 t.025 t.010 t.005 
120 1.289 1.658 1.980 2.358 2.617 
Table 8.   Critical Values of t 
The degrees of freedom used to interpret the t-statistic are defined as the 
number of observations, n, minus the number of regressors in the sample.  In this 
case, the number of observations, n, represents the number of trading days used in 
the regression (average 120 days +/- 1 day).  There is one regressor, so the degrees 
of freedom are equal to the number of trading days minus one.  The table lists 
critical values of t for 120 and then 140 degrees of freedom.  In this case, the 
degrees of freedom used to determine the critical t value threshold is 120, since that 
is the closest value in the table that matches the actual degrees of freedom from the 
event studies. 
The t-statistic thresholds used to determine the level of statistical significance 
of the abnormal return are listed below in Table 9 and are based on the critical 
values of t listed in the above table. 















Table 9.   t-Statistic Thresholds 
For example, if the t-statistic is lower than the critical value of t at 1.289, then 
the finding is not significant, and the null hypothesis (the abnormal return actually 
equals zero) is accepted.  It is then probable that the abnormal return reflected 
happened by chance. If the t-statistic is greater than the critical value for t of 1.289 
but is less than 1.658, then the finding is significant at the 10% level, and the 
inference is of weak statistical significance.  Even so, the finding is considered 
significant enough to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis—thereby concluding the abnormal return is not equal to zero; the 
consolidation announcement affected the stock price return, and the probability is 
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statistical significance, the smaller the probability that the abnormal return happened 
by chance. 
The t-statistic is calculated for each of the 250 regression runs involving both 
the arithmetic and the logarithmic returns used to calculate the abnormal returns.  
Several of these data calculations (106 in total) were run again in the robustness 
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IV.  Data Analysis 
A. Overview  
The purpose of this section is to present the findings of the 250 event studies 
for the top five US defense contractors.  Each data set contains the results of the 
event studies and is presented first in terms of the arithmetic returns, and then in 
terms of the logarithmic returns.  Each company’s events are presented in depth 
individually; however, in the way of an overview, the following table represents 
composite percentages of those abnormal returns found to be statically significant 
across all 125 of the arithmetic return events and then across all 125 of the 

















Boeing  31.6% 16.7% 83.3% 
Lockheed Martin 40.0% 40.0% 60.0% 
General Dynamics 27.8% 80.0% 20.0% 
Raytheon 44.4% 37.5% 62.5% 
Northrop Grumman 66.7% 22.2% 77.8% 
Table 10.   Summary of Arithmetic Return % of Statistically Significant Events 
For the entire set of 125 regression runs across each of the five contractors’ 
announcement dates (using the arithmetic returns calculation as the baseline), only 
42% result in statistically significant abnormal returns either on or one day after the 
announcement date.  As noted in Table 10, two contractor results are higher than 
the overall average.  Raytheon’s announcements concerning its plans to consolidate 
resulted in statistically significant abnormal returns 44% of the time, and Northrop 
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statistically significant abnormal returns 67% of the time.   Lockheed, Boeing and 
General Dynamics’ frequency of occurrence of statistically significant abnormal 
returns fell at or below 40% when the researcher used the arithmetic return to 
calculate the abnormal returns.   
On average, 40% of the events experiencing statistically significant abnormal 
returns based on the arithmetic return are positive, while 60% are negative 
statistically significant abnormal returns. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and 
Northrop Grumman maintained statistically significant abnormal returns that followed 
this pattern (more were negative than positive).  In the case of Boeing, the 
statistically significant abnormal returns were overwhelmingly negative 83% of the 
time; likewise, for Northrop Grumman, the statistically significant abnormal returns 
were overwhelmingly negative 78% of the time.  However, 80% of General 
Dynamics’ statistically significant abnormal returns were positive, and 20% were 
negative. This suggests, in the case of General Dynamics, the market perception 
was much more positive in response to the company consolidation announcements.  
Overall, the results using the arithmetic return calculations suggest the 
announcement of an impending consolidation did not always result in a statistically 
significant abnormal return on the stock price of the respective defense contractor.  
The results also suggest that when there is a statistically significant abnormal return, 
the returns are more likely to decrease than increase (in four out of five of the top 
defense contractors). 
The results using the logarithmic returns reflected a similar overall percentage 
of events experiencing statistically significant abnormal returns: 41%. The 
percentage of positive and negative statistically significant abnormal returns is also 
consistent with the overall results using the arithmetic returns.  Overall, using the 
logarithmic returns, 39% of the events experiencing statistically significant abnormal 
returns experienced increases in those returns (positive abnormal returns), while 
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decreases in those returns (negative abnormal returns).  Table 11 lists the overall 
results using the logarithmic returns to calculate the abnormal returns. 
Contractor 















Boeing  26.3% 20.0% 80.0% 
Lockheed Martin 47.8% 45.5% 54.5% 
General Dynamics 30.6% 63.6% 36.4% 
Raytheon 44.4% 37.5% 62.5% 
Northrop Grumman 59.3% 18.8% 81.2% 
Table 11.   Summary of Logarithmic Return % of Statistically Significant Events 
This data appears to suggest that using the logarithmic returns to determine 
statistically significant abnormal returns will yield the same overall percentage of 
positive and  negative results.  However, when examining the statistically significant 
results as broken down by contractor, the researcher found three (Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin and Raytheon) out of five contractor’s announcement events resulted in a 
greater percentage of occurrence of positive statistically significant abnormal returns 
and lower negative statistically significant returns.  General Dynamics and Northrop 
Grumman’s announcement events resulted in a lower percentage of occurrence of 
positive statistically significant abnormal returns and a higher percentage of negative 
statistically significant abnormal returns.  This suggests that although the aggregate 
arithmetic and logarithmic returns percentages of events experiencing positive 
statistically significant abnormal returns are the same, the results tend to vary by 
contractor.  Thus, the logarithmic and arithmetic returns produce slightly different 
results.  
B. Boeing Company 
Boeing made 19 announcements between 1990 and 2006 concerning its 
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These event dates and the calculated t-statistic for the abnormal returns 
generated using the arithmetic return on the announcement date (and one day after 
the announcement) are presented in Table 12.  For ease of presentation and 
reading, the statistical significance of a t-statistic (t-stat) is only noted if it was at 
least significant at the 10% level.  Blank spaces in the Stat Sig columns in Table 12 
and subsequent tables included in the data analysis chapter represent statistically 
insignificant findings. 
Announce Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig 
t-stat day 
after Stat Sig 
8/1/1996 Rockwell International Corp. -0.9645  0.2125  
12/16/1996 McDonnell Douglas Corp 4.4298 1% -0.3802  
2/8/1999 Advanced Visual Software -0.9250  -0.08346  
7/2/1999 Radiant Energy Corp. -0.2270  -0.7121  
1/13/2000 Hughes Satellite Systems -1.0961  1.692 5% 
6/1/2000 Autometric, Inc. 0.7898  -0.6595  
6/27/2000 SVS, Inc. 0.2793  0.4455  
8/2/2000 Continental Graphics Corp. 0.8954  -0.8291  
8/15/2000 Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. -1.8254 5% -0.9324  
9/1/2000 AeroInfo Systems, Inc. 0.7164  0.5178  
10/17/2000 Hawker De Havilland Ltd. 0.3972  0.1101  
7/27/2001 SBS International -0.08792  0.647  
9/23/2002 
Flight Safety Boeing 
Training -1.7590 5% 1.657 5% 
1/10/2003 Conquest, Inc. -0.00047  0.7131  
5/4/2004 Frontier Systems, Inc. -0.8517  0.7874  
9/29/2004 MBDA -3.2955 1% 1.009  
3/3/2006 Carmen Systems AB -0.07311  -0.09483  
5/1/2006 Aviall, Inc. -0.0848  -0.05505  
8/18/2006 C-Map -1.4202 10% -0.6854  
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In the case of Boeing, 32% of the announcements resulted in statistically 
significant abnormal returns when the researcher used the arithmetic returns as the 
basis for calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically significant abnormal 
returns experienced by Boeing, 17% were positive, and 83% were negative.  
When the researcher utilized the logarithmic returns as the basis for 
calculating the abnormal return, one less event experienced a statistically significant 
abnormal return (Boeing Flight Safety); this altered the percentages of events 
experiencing positive or negative statistically significant abnormal returns.  Table 13 
contains the t-statistics and levels of statistical significance for each event using the 
logarithmic returns.   
Announce Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig 
t-stat day 
after Stat sig 
8/1/1996 Rockwell International Corp. -0.9457   0.221   
12/16/1996 McDonnell Douglas Corp 4.3529 0.05% -0.3767   
2/8/1999 Advanced Visual Software -0.9027   -0.05679   
7/2/1999 Radiant Energy Corp. -0.2197   -0.7168   
1/13/2000 Hughes Satellite Systems -1.1205   1.728 5% 
6/1/2000 Autometric, Inc. 0.7935   -0.6522   
6/27/2000 SVS Inc 0.2936   0.458   
8/2/2000 Continental Graphics Corp 0.9019   -0.8298   
8/15/2000 Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. -1.8603 5% -0.9315   
9/1/2000 AeroInfo Systems, Inc. 0.7247   0.5323   
10/17/2000 Hawker De Havilland Ltd. 0.4158   0.1239   
7/27/2001 SBS International -0.0793   0.6401   
9/23/2002 Flight Safety Boeing Training -0.9371   0.06851   
1/10/2003 Conquest, Inc. -0.0304   0.7075   
5/4/2004 Frontier Systems, Inc. -0.8491   0.7887   
9/29/2004 MBDA -3.3305 0.05% 1.011   
3/3/2006 Carmen Systems AB 0.0274   -0.03462   
5/1/2006 Aviall, Inc. 0.0704   -0.04142   
8/18/2006 C-Map -1.4296 10% -0.6886   
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Because there was one less statistically significant abnormal return, the 
percentages changed: 20% of events experienced positive statistically significant 
abnormal returns, and 80% of events experienced negative statistically significant 
abnormal returns.  
These results from both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns suggest 
Boeing’s announcements concerning its consolidation plans with other companies 
do not always result in statistically significant abnormal returns to its stock price; 
however, when the abnormal returns are statistically significant, those abnormal 
returns are overwhelmingly negative.  The large percentage of negative statistically 
significant abnormal returns using the arithmetic returns suggests the market 
perception of the announced consolidations is also negative. 
C.  Lockheed Martin 
Lockheed made two announcements prior to becoming Lockheed Martin; 
subsequently, Lockheed Martin made 23 subsequent announcements concerning its 
consolidation plans with other companies—for a total of 25 announcements between 
January 1990 and December 2006, as shown in Table 14.   
These event dates and the calculated t-statistic for the abnormal returns 
generated using the arithmetic return on the announcement date (and one day after 
the announcement) are presented in Table 14.  For ease of presentation and 
reading, the statistical significance of a t-statistic (t-stat) is only noted if it was at 
least significant at the 10% level.  Blank spaces in the Stat Sig columns represent 
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Announce Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig t-stat day after Stat sig
12/9/1992 Tactical Military Aircraft 6.0648 0.05% -1.1845   
8/30/1994 Martin Marietta 17.3116 0.05% 2.9637 0.05% 
1/8/1996 Loral Corp. 2.9257 0.05% -0.6538   
7/3/1997 Northrop Grumman Corp. -4.3990 0.05% 0.6553   
2/26/1998 Postal Technologies 1.5769 10% 0.09458   
12/14/1998 US Public Technologies LLC 0.7966   -1.913 10% 
1/8/1999 Canadian Public Technologies 0.0782   0.3874   
9/20/1999 Comsat Corp. -3.2440 0.05% 0.2853   
10/26/2001 Oao Corp. 0.8217   -0.9259   
3/11/2003 LongShot Wing Kit -0.9844   0.4737   
5/15/2003 ORINCON Industries -0.3720   -0.3486   
8/1/2003 Federal Govt IT Business -0.6233   0.1312   
9/15/2003 Titan Corp -0.0888   -1.763 5% 
10/29/2003 Astrolink International LLC -0.8921   0.3452   
10/29/2004 Sippican, Inc. -0.1282   1.171   
12/13/2004 STASYS Ltd. 0.8606   -1.531 10% 
2/18/2005 Sytex Group, Inc. -0.2419   0.0903   
8/16/2005 INSYS Group Ltd. 0.7317   0.7123   
9/8/2005 Coherent Technologies, Inc. -0.0151   -0.5666   
12/16/2005 Aspen Systems Corp 0.4200   -1.636 10% 
1/23/2006 HMT Vehicles Ltd. 0.7642   0.2962   
5/4/2006 Savi Technology, Inc. -0.8335   0.0945   
6/12/2006 ISX Corp -1.1303   -0.1453   
8/17/2006 Pacific Architects and Engineers -0.6353   -0.4793   
12/21/2006 Management Systems Designer 0.4846   -0.0601   
Table 14.   Lockheed Martin Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
In the case of Lockheed Martin, 40% of the announcements resulted in 
statistically significant abnormal returns when the researcher used the arithmetic 
returns as the basis for calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically 
significant abnormal returns experienced by Lockheed Martin, 40% were positive, 
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When using the logarithmic returns as the basis for calculating the abnormal 
return, the researcher found one more event which experiences a statistically 
significant abnormal return (Astrolink International LLC), and this altered the 
percentages of events experiencing positive or negative statistically significant 
abnormal returns.  Table 15 contains the t-statistics and levels of statistical 
significance for each event using the logarithmic returns.  Because there was one 
more statistically significant abnormal return, the percentages changed: 46% of 
events experienced positive statistically significant abnormal returns, and 54% of 
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Announce Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig 
t-stat day 
after Stat sig 
12/9/1992 Tactical Military Aircraft 5.8893 0.05% -1.1901   
8/30/1994 Martin Marietta 15.9493 0.05% 2.8767 0.05% 
1/8/1996 Loral Corp. 2.8855 0.05% 0.6500   
7/3/1997 Northrop Grumman Corp. -4.4377 0.05% 0.6759   
2/26/1998 Postal Technologies 1.5729 10% 0.09832   
12/14/1998 US Public Technologies LLC 0.8137   -1.932 5% 
1/8/1999 Canadian Public Technologies 0.0858   0.3903   
9/20/1999 Comsat Corp. -3.3134 0.05% 0.2892   
10/26/2001 Oao Corp. 0.8467   -0.9363   
3/11/2003 LongShot Wing Kit -0.9830   0.4852   
5/15/2003 ORINCON Industries -0.0852   -0.2885   
8/1/2003 Federal Govt IT business -0.6290   0.1394   
9/15/2003 Titan Corp -0.0853   -1.769 5% 
10/29/2003 Astrolink International LLC 2.5396 1% 0.122   
10/29/2004 Sippican, Inc. -0.1267   1.144   
12/13/2004 STASYS Ltd. 0.8558   -1.533 10% 
2/18/2005 The Sytex Group, Inc. -0.2359   0.1002   
8/16/2005 INSYS Group Ltd. 0.7380   0.7042   
9/8/2005 Coherent Technologies, Inc. -0.0083   -0.654   
12/16/2005 Aspen Systems Corp 0.4281   -1.659 5% 
1/23/2006 HMT Vehicles Ltd. 0.7662   0.3004   
5/4/2006 Savi Technology, Inc. -0.8278   0.11   
6/12/2006 ISX Corp -1.1379   -0.1395   
8/17/2006 
Pacific Architects and 
Engineers -0.6278   0.4693   
12/21/2006 
Management Systems 
Designer 0.4922   -0.05451   
Table 15.   Lockheed Martin Logarithmic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
These results from both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns suggest 
Lockheed Martin’s announcements concerning its consolidation plans with other 
companies do not always result in statistically significant abnormal returns to its 
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abnormal returns are negative.  The close percentage of positive and negative 
statistically significant abnormal returns using the arithmetic returns and the 
logarithmic returns suggests the market perception of the announced consolidations 
is close to a 50-50 split. 
D.  General Dynamics 
General Dynamics made a total of 36 consolidation announcements between 
January 1990 and December 2006 concerning its consolidation plans with other 
companies, as shown in Tables 16 and 17.   
These event dates and the calculated t-statistic for the abnormal returns 
generated using the arithmetic return on the announcement date (and one day after 
the announcement) are presented in Table 16.  For ease of presentation and 
reading, the statistical significance of a t-statistic (t-stat) is only noted if it was at 
least significant at the 10% level.  Blank spaces in the Stat Sig columns represent 
statistically insignificant findings. 
In the case of General Dynamics, only 28% of the announcements resulted in 
statistically significant abnormal returns when the researcher used the arithmetic 
returns as the basis for calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically 
significant abnormal returns experienced by General Dynamics, 80% were positive, 
and 20% were negative.  Of the five sets of US defense contractor data used in this 
case, General Dynamics was the only one to experience an overwhelming 
percentage of events experiencing positive statistically significant abnormal returns. 
When using the logarithmic returns as the basis for calculating the abnormal 
return, the researcher found one more event which experienced a statistically 
significant abnormal return (NASSCO Holdings, Inc.), and this altered the 
percentages of events experiencing positive or negative statistically significant 
abnormal returns.  Table 17 contains the t-statistics and levels of statistical 
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Announce Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig 
t-stat day 
after Stat Sig 
8/17/1995 Bath Iron Works Corp. 6.1569 0.05% -0.9329   
8/21/1997 
Advanced Technology 
Systems  -0.8578   0.3862   
11/3/1997 
 Computing Devices 
International  0.3394   0.1954   
9/4/1998 Caldwell's Diving Co. -0.9856   1.2470   
10/8/1998 NASSCO Holdings, Inc. 0.0285   -1.2397   
2/18/1999 Newport News Shipbuilding I 1.2592   0.1979   
5/17/1999 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. -3.8420 0.05% 0.2172   
6/22/1999 GTE Gvt Syst -0.0684   1.7590 5% 
4/13/2000  ENSB 0.8070   0.3709   
5/12/2000 Saco Defense Corp. -0.0564   0.2414   
9/12/2000 Matthews Land Co., Inc. -0.3090   -0.4684   
10/30/2000 Devcor, Inc. 1.8439 5% 1.2900 10% 
11/9/2000 Primex Technologies, Inc. 0.4955   -0.3010   
11/16/2000 Creative Concepts Corp. -0.1521   0.1428   
4/25/2001 Newport News Shipbuilding I -0.9193   1.7920 5% 
5/1/2001 Galaxy Aerospace Co LP 0.2938   0.7137   
8/6/2001 Motorola Integrated Information -0.8013   0.8217   
5/2/2002 Advanced Technical Products 0.4565   0.0227   
8/27/2002 Command System, Inc. 0.8156   -0.4443   
10/31/2002 EWK Eisenwerke Kaiserslaute 0.1328   0.0890   
12/19/2002 General Motors Defense 0.9864   -0.3219   
3/31/2003 Creative Technologies, Inc. -0.9308   0.3937   
6/9/2003 Veridian Corp/United States -0.9856   1.4270 10% 
7/25/2003 
Intercontinental Manufacturing 
Co. 0.2533   0.1661   
7/30/2003 Digital System Resources, Inc. -0.1491   0.5886   
9/30/2003 SSF-Holding GmbH 0.4388   1.0300   
3/11/2004 Alvis Plc -0.9838   1.5910 10% 
3/18/2004 Spectrum Astro, Inc. 1.0904   -1.6600 5% 
6/9/2004 TriPoint Global Comm. 0.2076   0.3463   
4/1/2005 MAYA Viz Ltd. 0.5417   0.1298   
8/3/2005 Itronix Corp. 0.0910   -0.3888   
8/16/2005 Tadpole Computer, Inc. -0.8786   0.5426   
12/13/2005 FC Business Systems, Inc. 1.3091 10% -0.4217   
12/14/2005 Anteon International Corp. -0.4258   2.4500 1% 
2/23/2006 SNC Technologies, Inc. 0.7593   0.5959   
5/17/2006 
Chamberlain Manufacturing 
Corp. -0.4812   0.1556   
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Announce 
Date Target t-Stat Stat Sig 
t-stat day 
after Stat sig 
8/17/1995 Bath Iron Works Corp. 5.9748 0.05% -0.9308   
8/21/1997 Advanced Technology Systems  -0.8548   0.3908   
11/3/1997 
 Computing Devices International 
Unit 0.3463   0.2042   
9/4/1998 Caldwell's Diving Co. -0.6871   0.8608   
10/8/1998 NASSCO Holdings, Inc. 0.0285   -2.5860 1% 
2/18/1999 Newport News Shipbuilding I 1.2510   0.2093   
5/17/1999 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp/D -4.0112 0.05% 0.2247   
6/22/1999 GTE Government Systems -0.0590   1.7340 5% 
4/13/2000  ENSB 0.8116   0.3786   
5/12/2000 Saco Defense Corp. -0.0446   0.2552   
9/12/2000 Matthews Landing Co., Inc. -0.2776   -0.4537   
10/30/2000 Devcor, Inc. 1.8349 5% 1.2940 10% 
11/9/2000 Primex Technologies, Inc. 0.5043   -0.2032   
11/16/2000 Creative Concepts Corp. -0.1428   0.1531   
4/25/2001 Newport News Shipbuilding I -0.9192   1.7710 5% 
5/1/2001 Galaxy Aerospace Co LP 0.3037   0.7196   
8/6/2001 Motorola Integrated Information -0.7979   0.8211   
5/2/2002 Advanced Technical Products 0.4565   0.0133   
8/27/2002 Command System, Inc. 0.8149   -0.4293   
10/31/2002 EWK Eisenwerke Kaiserslaute 0.1432   0.0994   
12/19/2002 General Motors Defense 0.9786   -0.3087   
3/31/2003 Creative Technologies, Inc. -0.9146   0.3945   
6/9/2003 Veridian Corp/United States -0.9715   1.3900 10% 
7/25/2003 
 Intercontinental Manufacturing 
Company 0.2640   0.1750   
7/30/2003 Digital System Resources, Inc. -0.1399   0.5981   
9/30/2003 SSF-Holding GmbH 0.4462   1.0310   
3/11/2004 Alvis Plc -0.9834   1.5840 10% 
3/18/2004 Spectrum Astro, Inc. 1.0905   -1.6700 5% 
6/9/2004 TriPoint Global Communications 0.2149   0.3507   
4/1/2005 MAYA Viz Ltd. 0.5467   0.1356   
8/3/2005 Itronix Corp. 0.0969   -0.3862   
8/16/2005 Tadpole Computer, Inc. -0.8797   0.5483   
12/13/2005 FC Business Systems, Inc. 1.3066 10% -0.4294   
12/14/2005 Anteon International Corp. -0.4235   2.4330 1% 
2/23/2006 SNC Technologies, Inc. 0.7625   0.6009   
5/17/2006 Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp. -0.3318   0.1291   
Table 17.   General Dynamics Logarithmic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
Because there was one more statistically significant abnormal return, the 
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abnormal returns, and 36% of events experienced negative statistically significant 
abnormal returns. 
These results from both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns suggest 
General Dynamics’ announcements concerning its consolidation plans with other 
companies did not always result in statistically significant abnormal returns to its 
stock price; however, when the abnormal returns were statistically significant, those 
abnormal returns were overwhelmingly positive when using the arithmetic returns.  
The close, high percentage of positive and statistically significant abnormal returns 
using the arithmetic returns suggests the market perception of the announced 
consolidations was positive.  Interestingly, in the case of General Dynamics, the 
logarithmic returns results suggest the market perception was not as strongly 
positive.   
E.  Raytheon 
Raytheon made a total of 18 consolidation announcements between January 
1990 and December 2006 concerning its consolidation plans with other companies, 
as shown in Tables 18 and 19.  Note: there are two date references for Defense 
Business.  These announcements regarding Raytheon’s acquisition of Defense 
Business were documented on each of the two dates.  Only the second 
announcement showed any statistically significant abnormal returns. 
These event dates and the calculated t-statistic for the abnormal returns 
generated using the arithmetic return on the announcement date (and one day after 
the announcement) are presented in Table 18.  For ease of presentation and 
reading, the statistical significance of a t-statistic (t-stat) is only noted if it was at 
least significant at the 10% level.  Blank spaces in the Stat Sig columns represent 
statistically insignificant findings. 
In the case of Raytheon, 44% of the announcements resulted in statistically 
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calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically significant abnormal returns 
experienced by Raytheon, 38% were positive and 62% were negative.   
Announce 







1/20/1993 Applied Remote Technology -1.3347 10% 1.531 10% 
2/17/1993 Power Group & Transportation -0.3420   -2.843 0.05% 
6/1/1993 Corporate Jets Business 1.0605   1.473 10% 
11/17/1993 Ebasco Services, Inc. -0.0217   2.548 0.05% 
9/9/1994 Xyplex, Inc. -0.3750   -2.516 0.05% 
4/3/1995 Raytheon E-Systems, Inc. -2.1226 2.5% -2.557 0.05% 
6/30/1995 Litwin Engineers & Construction -0.4432   0.4744   
4/8/1996 
2 Chrysler Technologies 
Business -1.0318   0.293   
1/6/1997 Defense business 0.3720   -0.833   
1/16/1997 Defense Business 1.7945 5% -0.06199   
7/21/1998 
Communication System 
Business -1.2441   1.229   
12/20/2002 Solipsys Corp. 0.0594   0.8501   
12/20/2002 JPS Communications, Inc. 0.0594   0.8501   
7/25/2003 
Aerospace and Defense 
Services -0.9681   -0.6129   
10/6/2004 Photon Research Associates -1.7646 5% -0.9233   
8/22/2005 UTD, Inc. -0.5218   0.5187   
12/29/2005 Flight Options LLC -0.5718   1.142   
7/5/2006 Virtual Technology Corp. -0.0705   -0.0909   
Table 18.   Raytheon Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
When the researcher used the logarithmic returns as the basis for calculating 
the abnormal return, exactly the same percentage of events experienced statistically 
significant abnormal returns as when she used the arithmetic returns.  Table 19 
contains the t-statistics and levels of statistical significance for each event using the 
logarithmic returns.   Again, 44% of the announcements resulted in statistically 
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calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically significant abnormal returns 
experienced by Raytheon, 38% were positive, and 62% were negative.   
These results from both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns suggest 
Raytheon’s announcements concerning its consolidation plans with other companies 
did not always result in statistically significant abnormal returns to its stock price; 
however, when the abnormal returns were statistically significant, those abnormal 
returns were usually negative when the researcher used either the arithmetic or the 
logarithmic returns.   
Announce 
Date Target t-Stat 
Stat 
Sig t-stat day after 
Stat 
sig 
1/20/1993 Applied Remote Technology -1.3443 10% 1.518 10% 
2/17/1993 
Power Group & 
Transportation -0.3723   -2.986 0.05%
6/1/1993 Corporate Jets Business 0.4418   1.457 10% 
11/17/1993 Ebasco Services, Inc. 0.2962   2.536 1% 
9/9/1994 Xyplex, Inc. -0.3744   -2.191 1% 
4/3/1995 Raytheon E-Systems, Inc. -2.1368 2.5% -2.575 1% 
6/30/1995 Litwin Engineers & Construction -0.4414   0.4783   
4/8/1996 
2 Chrysler Technologies 
Business -1.0362   0.3021   
1/6/1997 Defense Business 0.3767   -0.8176   
1/16/1997 Defense Business 1.7598 5% -0.03469   
7/21/1998 
Communication System 
Business -1.2749   1.236   
12/20/2002 Solipsys Corp. 0.0754   0.852   
12/20/2002 JPS Communications, Inc. 0.0754   0.852   
7/25/2003 
Aerospace and Defense 
Services -0.7630   -0.6137   
10/6/2004 Photon Research Associates -1.7673 5% -0.9225   
8/22/2005 UTD, Inc. -0.5310   0.5146   
12/29/2005 Flight Options LLC -0.5739   1.149   
7/5/2006 Virtual Technology Corp. -0.0081   -0.0348   
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The results of both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns suggest the market 
perception of the announced consolidations is positive more than half of the time the 
occurrences are statistically significant.   
F.  Northrop Grumman 
Northrop Grumman made a total of 27 consolidation announcements between 
January 1990 and December 2006 concerning its consolidation plans with other 
companies, as shown in Tables 20 and 21.   
These event dates and the calculated t-statistic for the abnormal returns 
generated using the arithmetic return on the announcement date (and one day after 
the announcement) are presented in Table 20.  For ease of presentation and 
reading, the statistical significance of a t-statistic (t-stat) is only noted if it was at 
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4/4/1994 Grumman Corp. -2.9968 0.05% 1.0960  
1/3/1996 Defense Electronics Business -4.6300 0.05% -1.3600 10% 
5/5/1997 Logicon, Inc. -3.5200 0.05% 0.6461  
7/3/1997 Lockheed Martin Corp. 19.0300 0.05% 1.5100 10% 
8/10/1998 Inter-National Research Ins. -1.4800 10% -0.9221  
8/21/1998 1,415 Acre Radar Test Site 1.1710  1.8810 5% 
3/11/1999 Information Systems Division 0.1168  1.7620 5% 
5/19/1999 Data Procurement Corp, Inc. 0.5927  0.7901  
5/27/1999 Ryan Aeronautical -1.2880 10% -0.0570  
11/12/1999 Navia Aviation AS 0.4804  0.7028  
4/10/2000 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 0.9198  0.7115  
6/12/2000 Comptek Research, Inc. -2.2370 2.5% -1.3560 10% 
9/6/2000 Federal Data Corp. -0.0848  -0.2766  
9/18/2000 Sterling Software US, Inc. 0.2461  -0.7786  
12/21/2000 Litton Industries, Inc. -0.3499  -5.2799 0.05% 
4/6/2001 Solystic SA -0.3370  -1.0378  
4/20/2001 
Electronics & Information 
Systems -0.7825  -1.8900 5% 
5/9/2001 Newport News Shipbuilding I -1.6861 5% 0.9126  
2/22/2002 
Northrop Grumman Space & 
Missiles -2.8993 0.05 -0.4274  
12/6/2002 TRW Marzocchi Automotive 0.8445  0.0514  
12/18/2002 Fibersense Technology Corp. 1.6861 5% 0.4284  
7/24/2003 Xontech, Inc. -1.5262 10% 0.3121  
1/31/2005 Electro Optic Systems Holding -0.3845  -1.8900 5% 
3/21/2005 Integic Corp. 0.7259  0.7405  
9/21/2005 Rights to Proprietary Software -2.9708 0.05% -1.7982 5% 
3/21/2006 CEA Technologies Pty Ltd. -0.0694  -0.0581  
11/8/2006 Essex Corp. -2.7992 0.05% -0.3440  
Table 20.   Northrop Grumman Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
In the case of Northrop Grumman, 68% of the announcements resulted in 
statistically significant abnormal returns when the researcher used the arithmetic 
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percentage of events experiencing statistically significant abnormal returns across 
the five US defense industry contractors analyzed in this case study.  Of these 
statistically significant abnormal returns experienced by Northrop Grumman, 22% 
were positive, and 78% were negative.   
When the researcher used logarithmic returns as the basis for calculating the 
abnormal return, the percentage of events that experienced a statistically significant 
abnormal return (in contrast to using the arithmetic returns) decreased.  Table 21 
contains the t-statistics and levels of statistical significance for each event using the 
logarithmic returns. Only 59% of the announcements resulted in statistically 
significant abnormal returns when the researcher used the logarithmic returns as the 
basis for calculating the abnormal return.  Of these statistically significant abnormal 
returns experienced by Northrop Grumman, 19% were positive, and 81% were 
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Announce 







4/4/1994 Grumman Corp. -3.0908 0.05% 1.0784   
1/3/1996 Defense Electronics Business -4.7457 0.05% -1.3790 10% 
5/5/1997 Logicon, Inc. -3.5079 0.05% 0.6553   
7/3/1997 Lockheed Martin Corp. 17.0744 0.05% 1.5080 10% 
8/10/1998 Inter-National Research Ins. -1.4536 10% -0.8943   
8/21/1998 1,415 Acre Radar Test Site 0.4430   -0.0524   
3/11/1999 Information Systems Division 0.1283   1.7530 5% 
5/19/1999 Data Procurement Corp, Inc. 0.6044   0.7306   
5/27/1999 Ryan Aeronautical -1.3066 10% -0.5064   
11/12/1999 Navia Aviation AS 0.4854   0.7112   
4/10/2000 Explosive ordnance disposal 0.9284   0.7199   
6/12/2000 Comptek Research, Inc. -2.3089 2.5% -1.3640 10% 
9/6/2000 Federal Data Corp. -0.0762   -0.2701   
9/18/2000 Sterling Software US, Inc. -0.2404   -0.7716   
12/21/2000 Litton Industries, Inc. -0.4011   -5.4890 0.05%
4/6/2001 Solystic SA -0.3306   -1.0300   
4/20/2001 
Electronics & Information 
Systems -0.7790   -1.9230 5% 
5/9/2001 Newport News Shipbuilding I -1.7031 5% 0.9087   
2/22/2002 
Northrop Grumman Space & 
Missiles -3.0809 0.05% -0.4517   
12/6/2002 TRW Marzocchi Automotive 0.8298   0.0621   
12/18/2002 Fibersense Technology Corp. 1.6445 5% 0.4307   
7/24/2003 Xontech, Inc. -1.5430 10% 0.3194   
1/31/2005 Electro Optic Systems Holding -0.4154   -0.2636   
3/21/2005 Integic Corp. -0.5642   -0.8334   
9/21/2005 Rights to Proprietary Software -3.0142 0.05% -1.8050 5% 
3/21/2006 CEA Technologies Pty Ltd. -0.0694   -0.0581   
11/8/2006 Essex Corp. -2.8255 0.05% -0.3447   
Table 21.   Northrop Grumman Logarithmic Return Events: Statistical Significance 
The results produced from using both the arithmetic and logarithmic returns 
suggest Northrop Grumman’s announcements concerning its consolidation plans 
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returns to its stock price; however, these plans did result in statistically significant 
abnormal returns more than half of the time.  When the abnormal returns were 
statistically significant, they were overwhelmingly negative.  This suggests the 
market perception of the announced consolidations, when found to be statistically 
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V.  Conclusion 
This case study examines and analyzes whether or not there is a statistically 
significant reaction in financial markets to the announcements of US defense 
contractor consolidations (mergers and acquisitions) from January 1990 to 
December 2006 for the top five US defense industry contractors.  Although this 
analysis is noted as being limited in scope and is not exhaustive, it does suggest 
several key findings worth noting. 
First, the percentage of events from the composite data experiencing 
statistically significant abnormal returns was 41-42%, whether the arithmetic or 
logarithmic returns are used in the calculations. This suggests that on average, less 
than 50% of the announcements of contractor consolidation had an effect on the 
statistically significant abnormal returns for the stock value.     
Second, when the researcher analyzed each individual defense contractor’s 
events using either the arithmetic or the logarithmic returns, four out of five of the 
contractor percentages of events experiencing statistically significant abnormal 
returns generate a greater percentage of statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns than statistically significant positive abnormal returns.  This suggests the 
market’s perceived value of the stocks for Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and 
Northrop Grumman decreased in value when their respective consolidation 
announcements were made between January 1990 and December 2006.  This 
conclusion is generally consistent with information available from that same period of 
time—suggesting the mergers and acquisitions were accomplished largely due to 
necessity for survival in the industry.   
General Dynamics is the exception in this finding because this defense 
contractor experiences a much greater percentage of positive statistically significant 
returns (80%) than negative statistically significant abnormal returns (using the 
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events experiencing positive statistically significant abnormal returns (64%) than 
those experiencing negative statistically significant abnormal returns (36%) (using 
the logarithmic returns).  This suggests the market’s perceived value of the stocks 
for General Dynamics increased in value when it made consolidation 
announcements between January 1990 and December 2006.  As of 1999, General 
Dynamics stock was notably regarded as rising for most of the decade of the 1990s 
(Flanagan, 1999).   
Interestingly, of the five US defense contractors referenced in this case, 
General Dynamics has the lowest percentage of events experiencing statistically 
significant abnormal returns (28%).   These findings related to General Dynamics in 
the aggregate suggest that many contractor consolidation announcements had no 
effect on the abnormal returns for the stock value; however, where those abnormal 
returns are found to be statistically significant, they are more likely to increase rather 
than decrease. 
Third, of the five US defense contractor consolidation announcement events 
analyzed in this case, Northrop Grumman has the highest percentage of events 
experiencing statistically significant abnormal returns (67%).  This finding suggests 
the market perception of the consolidation announcements made by Northrop 
Grumman is usually statistically significant, and where the resulting abnormal returns 
are statistically significant, the value of Northrop Grumman’s stock typically 
decreases (78% of the time). 
Fourth, the overall findings in this case of event studies is rather mixed, 
suggesting insignificant overall findings.  In order to conduct a successful event 
study, it is imperative for researchers to identify the exact date of the event.  This 
has indeed been accomplished in this case study; however, it is also useful to note 
that during the 1990-2006 timeframe, these mergers and acquisitions (and the 
overall consolidation of the US defense industry) had been frequently debated in the 
political arena—thereby making many of the consolidations anticipated.  Such 
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gradually incorporated in such a way that the announcement date would have no 
statistically significant effect on the abnormal returns.     
Similar issues were encountered and conclusions drawn in other event 
studies, particularly those concerning the impact of deposit interest-rate ceilings for 
thrift institutions (Dann & James, 1982). MacKinlay notes that Larry Dann and 
Christopher James (1982) decided not to consider a change in 1973 because it was 
due to legislative action.  The study of merger-related regulation announcements 
(Schipper & Thompson, 1983) is another example of mixed results in event studies. 
In this case, the results were found to be significant for the major acquiring firm; 
however, the results were mixed in the sense that some were positive, and others 
were negative statistically significant changes in the value of the firm.   
The case study results underscore the mixed-net effect the announcement 
date of a proposed merger or acquisition has on the market value for each of the top 
five defense contractors; the results also provide circumstantial evidence suggesting 
the level of influence public policy debates can have on the value of a company’s 
stock.  Clearly, there is not enough evidence to conclude the public debate of the 
issue is what caused the mixed results in the event studies; however, this correlation 
might give policy makers pause to consider the impact of the merger and acquisition 
debates on wealth effects, should the DoD again need to address the issue in the 
future.   
Many studies have been conducted using the event-study methodology, and 
the results have shown in some cases that stock prices do respond to new 
information. The assumption has been maintained that the market responds 
rationally to such announcements.  In contrast, the announcements of the 
acquisition of publicly traded firms by other publicly traded firms have not always had 
a consistently significant beneficial effect on the shareholder wealth of the acquiring 
firms (Schipper & Thompson, 1983).   Results of this case study not only support the 
latter assertion and add to the body of research involving event studies concerning 
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Justice policy makers with quantifiable and unbiased data to support future policy 
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VI.  Recommendations for Future Research 
A.  Expand Study to Include other Defense Contractors 
This case of event studies is limited to only five of the aerospace and defense 
contractors; however, expansion of the research to include other defense 
contractors would provide a larger data sample from which it would be possible to 
record trends in the magnitude and frequency of the statistically significant 
outcomes.  A larger sample of defense contractor event studies would then provide 
a larger pool from which to compare pre- and post-merger trends.   
B.  Compare Results to Pre- and Post-merger Trends  
As mentioned in the introduction, the data gathered from this research can be 
used as the baseline for comparison when researchers examine pre- and post-
merger trends in the respective company’s financial performance.  When examining 
the ex post data in light of the market perceptions of the consolidations, researchers 
are then able to determine whether the market’s perception of the merger or 
acquisition became a reality for the company in question.   
This would be a particular area of interest for additional research because 
there seems to have been (and continues to be) a concern that the wave of 
consolidation which occurred largely between 1990 and 2000 has adversely affected 
defense industry contractors.  Very little quantifiable data seems to be available, and 
that which is does not tie it to the market perception of the value (or loss of value) 
due to the defense industry consolidation. 
C. Perform Similar Event Study Analysis on Targets 
This case of event studies focused on the top five defense contractors as the 
primary acquirers in the consolidation announcement events, and it was the 
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interesting to investigate whether there were statistically significant abnormal returns 
on the target’s stock price on the date the consolidation announcement was made.   
An analysis of this kind would be valuable because it would complete the 
market perspective on the date of the consolidation announcement and explore the 
market’s perception of the value of the acquisition or merger to both the target and 
the acquirer. 
D.  Conduct Qualitative Research to Suggest Reason for 
Statistically Significant Results 
The documented press surrounding General Dynamics’ acquisition of Anteon 
is positive and is noted to indicate the US Department of Defense’s interest in 
investing in information technology (Merle, 2005).  This particular event was found to 
be linked to highly statistically significant abnormal stock returns for General 
Dynamics (Tables 16 and 17 above).  Additional qualitative research resulting in 
revelatory findings like this would provide more in-depth understanding of the events 
in this study experiencing statistically significant abnormal returns. 
E. Perform Robustness Checks  
It would be most helpful to find additional indices for the January 1990 and 
December 2006 timeframe to complete a robustness check.  The PHLX defense 
sector index data is only available from April 2002, through June 2006, and is not 
comprehensive enough to cover the timeframe of this study. No earlier data was 
available through online sources like www.yahoofinance.com, and the NPS account 
to the Bloomberg database did not offer any other alternatives. 
Perhaps with additional time, earlier defense-sector index information could 
be compiled, or better yet, the defense sector index could be constructed for use in 
the robustness check.  Comprehensive robustness checks on the event studies 
would increase the integrity and fidelity of the data gathered, as well as inferences 
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